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ABSTRACT This article attempts to explore the introduction and progress of the idea and
concept of free speech in Malaysia. It demonstrates that the idea of freedom and liberty has
existed since the feudal period of the Malay Sultanate. However, the idea was very limited owing
to constraints imposed by the feudal kings. The people saw the kings as divine figures. When the
British colonised the Malay states, they introduced the modern Western concept of free speech.
This was later embedded in the Malayan/Malaysian Constitution during the country’s
independence in 1957 as one of the essential fundamental liberties of the people. However, the
British were also responsible for introducing several repressive laws, such as the Printing Presses
and Publications Ordinance. The Malaysian government continued this policy after independence
to the detriment of the practice of free speech in the country.
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Introduction
The development of the idea of free speech in Malaysia can be traced back to the
early years of the pre-colonial era, the period of British colonisation, and
independence in 1957. The main purpose of this article is to offer an historical
account of the idea of free speech and its role in Malaysian politics. Malaysia’s
experience is related to the establishment of the idea of free speech and the
innovation of print media in the West.
The concept of freedom of speech developed in the 17th and 18th centuries in the
United States and Europe. The mass media, however, came into being only in
the 1830s, with the invention of the penny press (Lichtenberg, 1987, p. 350).
The intellectual heritage of the idea of free speech and free press is long and
impressive.
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Feudalism and Pre-colonial Malay Sultanate
The Malay Sultanate (or the feudal era in Malaysia) started in the ‘glorious era’ of
Melaka (Malacca) between 1400 and 1511, and was marked by a system of absolute
monarchy. In this period Malay society was basically divided into two traditional
social strata, the ruling class comprising kings and noblemen, and the ruled class
including ordinary people and slaves (Rustam, 1983, p. 142). The ruler had absolute
power and was a protector of the ruled, who had a political duty to be loyal to the
ruler. Relations between the ruler and the ruled were based on an idea of social
contract that emerged from the concepts of ‘sovereign’ (daulat) and ‘disloyal’
(derhaka). The concept of ‘daulat’ or ‘sovereign’, which could be extended into the
word ‘kedaulatan’ or ‘sovereignty’, meant that the Malay rulers were in a special
position as divine rulers in society, which could not be challenged or criticised by the
people. The concept of ‘derhaka’ or ‘disloyal’ referred to any acts and expressions
against the king’s order (Zainal, 1970, p. 20). However, relations between the ruler
and the ruled were based on an agreement or social contract between them. The
social contract was derived from a myth of dialogue between Sang Sapurba
representing the ruler and Demang Lebar Daun representing the ruled. According to
that social contract, the ruled are loyal servants to the ruler as long as the ruler
brings prosperity and justice to society. If the ruler violated his contract by brutality
and oppression, the people could act to bring down the ruler; but, this rarely
happened in Malay history. The dialogue is illustrated in the ‘Sejarah Melayu’ (The
Malay Annals), revealing that:
As he raised his clasped hands to his forehead to pay homage to the king,
Demang Lebar Daun said, ‘Please let it be known that my children and grand
children are ever willing to be servants to Your Majesty and children and
grandchildren of Your Majesty. Should they be found to commit serious sins
please do not overlook them, or curse them with abusive words; if the sins are so
serious and violate the rules of our religion have them sentenced to death’. So
replied Sang Sapurba, ‘It is my hope that up to the end of time that your
children and grandchildren will not betray and become unfaithful to my
children and grandchildren, even if they are cruel and of evil and immoral
character’. To this Demang Lebar Daun replied, ‘Your Majesty, the situation
will remain as they are now unless your descendant seeks to change them, and
thus my descendant will have to react accordingly’. (Shellabear, 1975,
pp. 19–20)
The Malay kings obtained legitimacy and divine power through a belief that they
had been chosen by God to rule the earth. It was also believed that they had
supernatural power in their royal blood, and people were prohibited from
challenging, replacing and toppling them (Taib, 1985, p. 48). Hence, people did
not have the right to express any views against the ruler. Any criticisms of the king
could be considered as disloyalty or treason. In general, disloyalty incurred harsh
punishment, including the death penalty.
Farish A. Noor (1999, pp. 152–155; 2001, p. 57) demonstrates that the Malay
Sultanate was influenced by Hindu and Buddhist traditions, where the ruling elites
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were inclined to retain the traditional ideology of power and domination sanctioned
by their own Malay-centric interpretation of Hindu–Buddhist God-king (Dewaraja)
philosophy, which aimed at deification and aggrandisement of the monarchs. Syed
Naquib al-Attas explains:
This was a religio-political system of values that was based on highly selective
interpretation of Hinduism and Buddhism, which on the one hand accentuated
the elements that were most conducive to the development of an authoritarian
and patriarchal system of rule while on the other hand neglected the elements
related to the sphere of the individual’s development, social standing, and
rights. (Noor, 1999, p. 152)
People’s lives were concentrated around the life of the king. However, when Islam
came to Melaka during the Malay Sultanate era, the king and also the people
converted to Islam and embraced Islam as a way of life. Islam gave guidance by
allowing ‘ijtihad’ or freedom of thought for making decisions, picturing the
impermanent world with a lot of injustice, and stressing equality of human beings
without regard to race, gender or status. Although Islam was accepted and applied
by the Malay community, Islamic teaching was assimilated with values and practices
of the pre-Islamic period, mainly Hinduism, Buddhism and Animism, especially
through the ideas of divine royalty and feudalistic political culture.
Malay-Islamic loyalty to the king was a conditional loyalty as expressed by an old
phrase that encouraged the people to ‘Worship a just king, Oust a cruel king’. It
meant that the king and the people should have a good understanding of their
respective roles and responsibilities. A similar sentiment was expressed in another
old quotation saying, ‘The people cannot be disloyal, the king cannot be cruel’
(Siddiq, 1992, p. 108). Political culture grew out of this practice of feudal headship.
Chandra Muzaffar (1979, p. 30) makes an interesting analysis of the patron–client
relationship within the context of political feudalism in Malaysia specifically with
regard to the maintenance of legitimate rule by the Malay elites. Muzaffar relies
heavily on the concept of unquestioning loyalty (kesetiaan membuta-tuli) as an
attitude that resides in the psychological processes of both the ruling and ruled class
in Malay society. Thus, he argues that submissiveness to rule is a product of the
hierarchical system and structure of Malay society, with a ruling class and a subject
class, generating its own consciousness among its participants. Since independence in
1957, both Malay and non-Malay communities owe respect to the Malay Sultanates,
particularly Yang di-Pertuan Agong (the king), and currently they are required to
pay the same respect to the political elites, especially the Prime Minister.
Anthony Reid (1998, pp. 141–160) has argued that in the pre-colonial Malay
peninsular states the concept of freedom was embodied in the terms merdeka
(freedom) and orang merdeka (freeman) in relation to slaves. These terms were to be
found in the Undang-undang Melaka (Melaka Laws). Freedom had not developed
further into an intrinsic social value to be upheld for all; not everyone was equal
before the law. In fact, the organised struggle for individual liberty did not emerge in
many pre-colonial non-Western societies until the colonial period. It was then that
the struggle for independence and democracy went hand in hand with the struggle
for individual human rights. Cheah Boon Kheng (2001, p. 73) agrees with Reid that
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the idea of freedom, including freedom of speech, had already taken root in the pre-
colonial Malay states and it is not specifically Western in origin. This is because the
sense of individual worth appealed to the landless peasants, who were often pressed
into forced labour or reduced to slavery to pay off their debts—a type of debt-
bondage the ruling elite perpetuated (Noor, 2001, p. 59). Malay works, such as ‘Taj-
us-Salatin’ (The Crown of Kings), Nuruddin ar-Raniri’s ‘Bustannu’-us-Salatin’
(Garden of Kings) and the ‘Sejarah Melayu’ (The Malay Annals), preach good
government and attack royal injustice. They urge the rulers to govern with the advice
of their ministers and to care for the welfare of their subjects. They uphold the rights
of their subjects to resist oppression, corruption and injustice (Cheah, 2001, p. 67).
Although the idea of free speech existed in the pre-colonial era, the modern system
that institutionalises free speech barely existed during the time of the Malay
Sultanate. This was introduced when the British colonised Malaya. Through the
colonial judicial system, for the first time local peoples were exposed to the idea as
understood by Westerners at that time. However, the British also introduced many
rules and regulations that restricted the practices of freedom of speech to protect
their interests as a colonial power.
Nationalism and the British Colonialist Era
During the period of the 19th century, more than 40 English language newspapers
appeared in the Malay Peninsula. What was obvious about the early English
newspapers was that the newspapers were to serve British interests in Malaya and
particularly to cater to the business community. News items from foreign countries,
especially in Europe, were given prominence as those events affected business in
Malaya. A large part of the contents of the newspapers was commercial news and
advertisements. Local news, which made up a small portion of the news column,
often focused on crime and shipping schedules (Dhari, 1992). The first newspaper in
Malaya, The Prince of Wales Island Gazette, was published in Penang in 1805. This
was followed by a host of newspapers, including The Malacca Observer, The Perak
Pioneer and The Malay Mail. One of the most popular newspapers in Malaysia and
Singapore today, The Straits Times (New Straits Times, Malaysia), began in 1845
under the name The Straits Times and Singapore Journal of Commerce (Dhari, 1992).
By the end of 19th century, there was a movement influenced by ethnocentrism
and ethnic-oriented media that existed to provide news for certain respective
communities only. The seeds of ethnocentrism were sown when the Malays
published Malay newspapers in the 1870s and 1900s. Early journalism in Malaya
was pioneered by non-Malays, in particular Indian Muslims, Arabs and Baba
Chinese. The first Malay weekly, the Jawi Peranakan, was published in 1876 in
Singapore. This was followed by other publications in Singapore, such as Sekolah
Melayu (1888), Peranakan (1891) and Bintang Timor (1894), and in Perak, Sri Perak
(1893). By the end of 19th century, at least 17 Malay language newspapers and
magazines appeared in Malaya (Dhari, 1992).
As mentioned earlier, there was little or no institutionalisation of individual
freedom or freedom of speech in the Malay states before colonial rule and the
introduction of the rule of law. Freedom of speech in the colonial period, however,
evolved painfully slowly and in fits and starts. The colonial government allowed
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some freedom of the press, but at the same time set up a double-standard rule and
banned newspapers that it felt would weaken its power and prestige.1
One of the causes of British government intervention in Malay states was the
demand of Europeans and British subjects in the Malay states for legal rights and
protections for their business interests. These were rights and privileges that they had
enjoyed in their home countries, but which were not yet available in the Malay states.
For that reason, the Malay states were pressed to set up a constitution, courts and a
judicial system along Western lines to protect the rights of British concessionaires
(mostly Western and Chinese traders), which had frequently been abrogated
arbitrarily by the Malay rulers (Cheah, 2001, pp. 59–60). For example, in Johor
state, the Johor Constitution had been established in 1895. The 1908 amendment of
the constitution was a major document of importance for freedom of speech.
Although the Constitution did not directly mention freedom of speech, it used the
word ‘freedom’, which referred to all practices of freedom and rights including
freedom of speech. Article 1 of the Constitution stated that no Malay in Johor who is
a subject of the sultan could lose his freedom or be imprisoned except by due process
of law (Fawzi, 1988, pp. 153–168).2 The sultan must also uphold the rights and
freedoms of the people and must remember that he had been appointed to his office
by the people in the hope that he would fulfil this expectation. This newly introduced
system led to the destruction of the system of absolute monarchy and the Malay
feudal economic and social system, and replaced it with a Western system of
bureaucratic and legal administration and economic capitalism.
Meanwhile, the spirit of nationalism among local people exploited the democratic
approach of self-determination and freedom of speech introduced by the British, and
used it to confront the British with demands for independence. In the early decades
of the 20th century, Malay nationalists utilised newspapers as a channel for
expressing Malay interests, problems and opposition to British administration
policies. ‘Kaum Muda’ (Youth Group) was the first nationalist group to use a
newspaper to spread its views, especially about the Malays’ struggle against
colonisation, education and Islamic teachings (Abdullah, 1985, pp. 85–87). They
challenged a more conservative and orthodox Islamic group called the ‘Kaum Tua’
(Old Group), represented by some religious scholars or ulama, religious teachers, and
community leaders who strongly protected feudalistic traditions, values and norms
(Khazin and Nabir, 1996, p. 329). ‘Kaum Muda’ had been formed by several Islamic
educated Malays, who had studied in Egypt and in the Arab Peninsula, including
Mecca and Madinah (Khazin and Nabir, 1996, p. 329). Among their leaders were
Syed Syeikh al-Hadi, Syeikh Tahir Jalaluddin, Haji Abbas Mohd Taha and Syeikh
Mohd Salim Al-Kalali, who were inspired by Syeikh Muhammad Abduh and his
struggle for independence in the Middle East. In the publication of the newspaper
Al-Imam in 1906, ‘Kaum Muda’ highlighted the evil of Western (British) colonisa-
tion, the value of political freedom, and the nationalist sentiment among local
Muslims (Khoo et al., 1982, p. 8). Al-Imam had published its first Malay-Jawi edition
on 23 July 1906 in Singapore. National sentiment was used to strengthen the local
movement for independence.
In the 1920s, the Malay press became increasingly critical of British colonial
policies. From 1910 until the 1930s, there was a rapid expansion in the number of
newspapers, reflecting the leniency of British policy towards the printed press and
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also the rapid development of printing technology. The Selangor, Negeri Sembilan
and Melaka teachers’ associations published the Majalah Guru in 1924. The Majalah
Guru discussed Malay socio-economic issues, education and language (Latif, 1985,
p. 130; Mek and Aminah, 1985, p. 250). The most significant role played by the
Malay newspapers was to boost political consciousness among the Malays and force
the British to change certain policies. For example, the Malay newspapers pushed for
the British administration to restructure the Federation Council. The British
conceded, and the Federation Council was restructured in 1927. The Malay sultans
gave up their power and posts in the Federation Council, and one Malay
representative, Abdullah Dahlan, was appointed to replace the sultans. Thereafter,
Malay newspapers continued to report discussions and debates in the Federation
Council (Khoo et al., 1982, p. 10).
The use of the press as a medium for people to express their views burgeoned in
the 1930s. Not only did the newspapers oppose the British but also some of them
played a pivotal role in changing the mentality of the Malay community, extending
ideas on the benefits of social transformation and self-determination. The newspaper
Majlis, formed in 1931, attempted to spread ideas about democracy and how Malays
could improve their conditions of life for the better. A good example was in an article
in the edition of 8 December 1945:
The Malay (umat Melayu) throughout the Malay Peninsula in general and in
Selangor in particular should be aware (sedar) and we believe are already aware
that according to the requirements of the era (zaman) after (sudah tamat) the
Second World War, the pattern of the world has changed to a democratic
hue . . . So also our Malay Peninsula which before was based on bureaucracy
will become democratic . . . which can lead to the conclusion that in the past
(di masa lalu) our Malay people usually looked to their raja (and his chiefs)
as the sole patron or leader to protect and defend the fate (nasib) and rights
(hak) of the Malay people, but in the end according to the trend in this
democratic era (zaman), all thoughts and beliefs like these among Malays must
be discarded (buang) and wiped clean away (dihapuskan licin). (Ariffin, 1993,
pp. 171–172)
TheMajlis strove to change Malay attitudes and political culture. The passage above
reflected the move towards democratisation in Malay society and away from
feudalism. It encouraged Malays to decide their own fate, promoting rights—
including a right to freedom of speech—as essential to the struggle to free the
country from British colonisation.
The Majlis, however, also made a brave move in arguing that the right of
‘sovereignty’ (kedaulatan), a prerogative of the royal family, was actually possessed
by the people. In order to apply democratic concepts to society, the Majlis proposed
the idea of the ‘sovereign people’ instead of the ‘sovereignty of the king’. However,
the concept of ‘sovereign people’ was limited to the Malay community and excluded
other groups. In its edition of 17 September 1947, the Majlis advocated that:
The meaning of democracy is that of a government (kerajaan) based on
the opinion of the people (rakyat) who possess the right of citizenship.
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The representatives who become members (ahli-ahli) of the (kerajaan)
council (mesyuarat) are people who are chosen or voted according to
the voice of the people. Here it can be seen that whatever is decided on in the
council is according to the will of the people. (Ariffin, 1993, p. 177)
Thus, the ideas of democracy and the need for freedom of speech slowly developed in
the community at that time, especially among educated people, political elites and
community leaders. The role of the media became particularly important as a vehicle
for freedom of speech.
Although the British had introduced and enforced the Printing Presses Ordinances
in 1920, the prevention of use and keeping of printing machines was applied only to
Chinese newspapers in the Straits Settlements (Penang, Melaka and Singapore). The
1939 amendment of the Ordinance that required a permit or licence for publication
was intended to stop Japanese propaganda in Malaya (Safar, 1996b, p. 5). Malay
newspapers were routinely permitted to publish, despite being regulated by the
Ordinance, because the British felt that the Malay newspapers were not effective in
undermining their position or their policies. The Malay newspapers published many
articles encouraging the people to fight the British, but they had little impact in the
Malay community owing to the small population of educated, or even literate,
Malays.
While developing Malaya’s economy, the British also created a ‘divided’ or ‘plural
society’—rendering ethnicity a more pressing factor through the encouragement of
mass migration of Chinese and Indian groups. John S. Furnivall (1956, p. 304)
argued that ethnic migration to Malaya, in response to demands of the colonial
economy, had given rise to a social order segmented by race and custom. Malayan
society was a plural society, with different sections of community living side by side,
but separately within the same political unit. Even in the economic sphere there was
a division of labour along racial lines. Alongside an ambivalent view of the colonial
legacy, this has helped maintain basic conceptions of ethnic division and communal
politics as ‘primordially given’ rather than as products of the colonial state itself
(Hilley, 2001, p. 23). Colonial policies and the identities they created helped shape
Malaysian society, in significant respects limiting the possibilities for democracy and
freedom of speech (Case, 2002, pp. 102–103). As Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth
Shepsle (1972) have observed in their study of developing countries with divided
societies, elections become censuses that crystallise political inequalities, worsening
ethnic tensions, sparking social violence, and finally undermining democratic
regimes.
In preparing to decolonise Malaya during the 1950s, the British abandoned their
pre-war authoritarian controls in order to institute democracy and embed freedom
of speech. In part this was motivated by a desire to shield their investments from
unchecked local governments, but they wished also to contrast their new electoral
principles with the violence of the Communist insurgency that raged at the time.
Hence, the British exposed local elites to consociational methods through a series of
Community Liaison Committees. At the same time they permitted the formation of
political parties. The party system that emerged remained tethered to the underlying
socio-economic structures. In brief, Malay civil servants and peasants gathered in
the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) expressly to protect their
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‘special rights’ against Chinese interlopers. Big Chinese traders formed the Malayan
Chinese Association (MCA) in order to defend their business interests. Indian
leaders formed the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), hoping to gain a toehold in
both politics and the economy (Case, 2002, p. 103). Then, in careful stages, the
British organised local elections in Penang in 1951, in Kuala Lumpur in 1952, and an
election for the federal council in 1955—the forerunner of a national Parliament.
Independence was later granted in 1957 (Case, 2002, p. 103). For the first time, the
right to free speech had been used in the elections and institutionalised in the Federal
Constitution in 1957.
It is clear that the British, in pursuing their colonisation agenda, introduced
several laws that curbed the right to free speech. However, the British also achieved
two important things in promoting the idea of freedom of speech: they
institutionalised freedom of speech in the constitution and Malayan political system,
and allowed the nationalist movement to use the press. Freedom of speech emerged
and progressed during the early years of independence, until the Malayan
government realised the powerful role of the press in influencing society and public
opinion. The government began to suppress freedom of the press during the 1959
general election. Freedom of speech started to be less available and accessible for the
public to practise in the independence era.
The Independence Era and Contemporary Situation
In the aftermath of the Malayan Union, the Malaya Federation 1948, and the
preparations for independence, a conference took place in early 1956 in London at
which agreement was reached on 31 August 1957 as the date for Malayan
independence. Prior to the London conference, the Reid Commission had been
established, led by Lord Reid as Chairman and with four other Western and
Western-educated members (Sir Ivor Jennings, a constitution expert from the United
Kingdom; William McKell, an ex-general governor from Australia; B. Malik, a
former judge from India; and Abdul Hamid, a judge from Pakistan) to establish a
constitution for Malaya. The Reid Commission accepted the inclusion of the right to
freedom of speech in the constitution after considering views expressed in the 131
memoranda sent by many different organisations and individuals, including the
Perikatan (Alliance) Party, which was represented by the UMNO, MCA and MIC
under the leadership of Malaya Chief Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman. The
Perikatan memorandum tackled sensitive and controversial issues such as citizen-
ship, Malay special rights, language, religion and many more, including human
rights (Zainal et al., 1992, p. 235).
The 1957 Federal Constitution had many of the elements of a democratic state,
including the rule of law, institutions and rights setting out people’s freedoms. The
Reid commissioners, in their ‘Report of the Constitutional Commission’, main-
tained:
A Federal constitution defines and guarantees the rights of the Federation and
the States: it is usual and in our opinion right that it should also define and
guarantee certain fundamental individual rights which are generally regarded as
essential conditions for a free and democratic way of life . . . The guarantee
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afforded by the Constitution is the supremacy of the law and the power and
duty of the Courts to enforce these rights and to annul any attempt to subvert
any of them whether by legislative or administrative action or otherwise.
(Means, 1970, pp. 186–187)
Some provisions in the Constitution did not amount just to ‘translations’ of other
constitutions, but were based on differences between British and Malayan societies.
The Constitution was drawn up with racial considerations explicitly in mind, and
some of its clauses laid down basic rules on this. Anti-subversion powers of detention
(Articles 149 and 150) also had a pro-Malay aspect, because they were directed
mainly against those involved in the Emergency, very few of whom were Malays
(Milne and Mauzy, 1999, p. 16). Malaya achieved independence in 1957 while the
country was still in a state of emergency against the Communist insurgency (1948–
60). Although Malaya had a constitution guaranteeing several civil liberties,
including freedom of speech, these were nullified by the Emergency Regulations,
which suspended those civil liberties. The Emergency Regulations did not end until
1960 when the Emergency was declared terminated and most civil liberties were
restored. Yet even with the end of the Emergency, the period of transitional justice
continued. The ruling elite in the UMNO–MCA–MIC Perikatan (Alliance)
government felt it necessary to retain many of the provisions of the Emergency
Regulations in the Internal Security Act (ISA) 1960, which allowed for preventive
detention. T. Rajamoorty, a Malaysian lawyer, said that the law had been used
frequently, ‘to detain individuals on account of their political activities or belief’
(Cheah, 2001, p. 76).
Freedom of speech is formally assured by Part II of the Federal Constitution
under Article 10(1) entitled ‘Freedom of Speech, Assembly and Association’. Article
10(1) provides that: (a) all citizens have the right to freedom of speech and
expression; (b) all citizens have the right to assemble peaceably and without arms;
and (c) all citizens have the right to form associations. However, although citizens
have a right to freedom of speech, Section 2 of the Article limits the right by allowing
Parliament to impose by law:
(a) on the rights conferred by paragraph (a) of Clause (1), such restrictions as it
deems necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of the Federation or
any part thereof, friendly relations with other countries, public order or
morality and restrictions designed to protect the privileges of Parliament or of
any Legislative Assembly or to provide against contempt of court, defamation,
or incitement to any offence. (Federal Constitution, 1999, p. 11)
Based on the provision above, the Perikatan and later Barisan Nasional (BN)
governments have sought to protect institutions, i.e. the Parliament, Courts, and
federal and states government, from a loss of credibility and confidence arising
from criticism facilitated by the practice of freedom of speech.3 The BN
government has tried to prevent the exploitation of freedom of speech by citizens
or foreigners that could embarrass the country, and in particular the government.
Meanwhile, Article 10(4) of the constitution explains the reason for restricting
freedom of speech:
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In imposing restrictions in the interest of the security of the Federation or any
part of thereof or public order under Clause (2) (a), Parliament may pass law
prohibiting the questioning of any matter, right, status, position, privilege,
sovereignty or prerogative established or protected by the provisions of Part II,
Article[s] 152, 153 and 182 otherwise in relation to the implementation thereof
as may [be] specified in such law. (Federal Constitution, 1999, p. 12)
The provision of Article 10(4) was part of the amendment of the Federal
Constitution in 1971 and was enforced on 10 March 1971 as a reaction to the
racial violence of 13 May 1969.
The constitution and other laws, however, have provisions that seek to punish
those who are found to be exceeding their right of expression by expressing
controversial views on issues such as the special rights of the Malays and other
indigenous people (bumiputera), Islam as national religion, the rights of immigrant
races (especially Chinese and Indians) to citizenship, the position of the king, the
status of the Malay language as the national language, and a host of other issues that
could potentially be sensitive in the context of the fragile race relations in the
country. It is argued that Malaysia as a multiracial society liable to racial conflict
requires such laws to prohibit the propagation of racial prejudice and religious
bigotry. The constitution also prohibits speech that advocates the forcible overthrow
of the government. Freedom of speech, it is argued, must be circumscribed by the
need for national stability and racial harmony.
In many Commonwealth constitutions, such as those of Malta, Jamaica and India,
Parliament is empowered to enact ‘reasonable restrictions’ on free speech. This
requires the setting down of reasons and justifications for restricting some forms of
speech that are considered harmful to society. The significance of the word
‘reasonable’ is that courts are invested with the power to review the validity of
legislation on the grounds of reasonableness, harshness or undemocratic nature of
the curbs. However, the drafters of Malaysia’s basic charter deliberately excluded the
word ‘reasonable’ from the law. Article 10(2) states that ‘Parliament may by law
impose . . . such restrictions as it deems necessary or expedient’ on a number of
prescribed grounds (Shad, 2002, p. 1). Article 4(2)(b) makes Parliament the final
judge of the necessity or expediency of a law and bars judicial review on the grounds
of lack of necessity or expediency. In Articles 10(2), 10(4), 149 and 150 Parliament is
authorised to restrict free speech on 14 broad grounds. So wide is its sweep of power
that the government has no difficulty in defending laws such as the Sedition Act
(SA), Official Secret Act (OSA), ISA and Printing Presses and Publications Act
(PPPA) as fully in accord with the basic charter. Even some existing statutes, such as
the PPPA, Sections 3(3), 6(1) and 12(2), confer on the Minister ‘absolute discretion’
to grant, refuse or revoke an annual licence or permit. Section 13A makes the
Minister’s decision final and not questionable in a court of law (Shad, 2002).
However, Parliament is not supreme. The Constitution supplies the ultimate
yardstick against which every law can be measured. In Dewan Undangan Negeri v.
Nordin Salleh (1992) it was held that Parliament may restrict free speech only on the
grounds specified in the Constitution. Similarly, Madhavan Nair v. Public Prosecutor
(1975) ruled that any condition limiting freedom of speech not falling within the four
corners of Article 10 clauses (2), (3) and (4) cannot be valid. Thus, the general
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grounds of ‘public interest’, ‘good government’, ‘state necessity’, ‘public policy’,
‘efficiency’ and ‘common sense’ are not constitutionally permitted grounds for
depriving a citizen of his right. Restrictions on free speech must be confined to those
articulated in the Constitution (Shad, 2002).
It is argued that ‘Democracy à la Malaysia’ (Muzaffar, 1989) or ‘democracy
according to our own mould’ (Saliha, 1997), as asserted by the BN government,
enables Malaysia to maintain its racial harmony, political and social stability and
internal security without compromising its economic resilience or being ‘over-zealous
about the democratic system’ (Saliha, 1997, p. 10). The former Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamad defended his record on the eve of his final parliamentary
appearance in October 2003 with regard to democracy and reiterated his position
that too much freedom could lead to anarchy and the destruction of Malaysia’s
multiracial society. Measures such as detention without trial of terrorist suspects and
the banning of the Communist Party from participating in the elections are essential
to maintain democracy and harmony. While believing in free speech the government
had to ensure that racial sentiment in the country would not be inflamed. He added:
If an individual or a small group tried to incite a (race) riot they are actually
rejecting democracy and the right of majority . . . That is why actions that seem
undemocratic towards the individual or the minority need to be taken to protect
real democracy . . . Anarchy can take place because of an obsession with
democracy. (Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM), 2004, p. 21)
Mahathir’s successor, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, in his first speech to Parliament on
assuming office as Prime Minister in November the same year, pledged to uphold
democracy while fighting terrorism and corruption. He also expressed his conviction
that democracy is the best system of governance, and the government must be open
and ready to accept criticism and contrary views if the culture of democracy is to
thrive. He added, however, that:
Democracy does not mean absolute freedom. Issues that inflame religious,
racial, and cultural sentiments should not be sensationalised, while attempts to
undermine national security must be dealt with firmly. (SUARAM, 2004, p. 21)
The year 2003 heralded a new era for Malaysia, as the 22-year rule of Mahathir came
to an end that October. Those concerned about human rights in Malaysia expressed
hope that the change in leadership would signal a change in attitudes towards, and
respect for, democracy and human rights in the country (SUARAM, 2004, p. 21).
The reality is that Abdullah and later Najib Razak (who assumed office as Prime
Minister in 2009), in managing and ruling the country, ensuring racial harmony and
stability, have adopted Mahathir’s policy in restricting political freedom and speech
when it is deemed to be a threat to national security, public order and the
government’s hold on power.
Shad Saleem Faruqi (2004, p. 136), in acknowledging that Malaysia has achieved
high levels of tolerance through the strict policy of prioritising national stability,
argues that Malaysia is an excellent example of religious and cultural tolerance.
Chinese and Indian migrant communities were granted citizenship rights at the time
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of independence. They were allowed to preserve their culture language and religion,
and hate crimes against the minority groups are largely unknown. Instead, Malaysia
has created a melting pot, a rich cultural mosaic. This has resulted in the emergence
of an extraordinarily multifaceted society with plural lifestyles. However, the
government’s lack of tolerance to the opposition parties makes openly critical
political speech difficult in Malaysia. Opposition activities, apart from being curbed
by restrictive laws, are also controlled by a complex web of institutional networks
such as municipal councils, district offices, schools and state-sponsored religious
establishments. The preservation of inter-racial harmony appears to be the
legitimising factor that props up the argument supporting the ruling elite’s
domination of the government, proposing the idea that political organisations
should consent to the larger programmatic mission of the ‘state-representing-the-
nation’ (Nair, 1999, pp. 92–93). Generally, the government, including the Prime
Minister, does not set a high priority on free speech. Indeed, the government is of the
view that opposition parties and human rights activists, often encouraged by foreign
countries and organisations, are a hindrance to the country’s economic development
and jeopardise its stability (Milne and Mauzy, 1999, p. 105). Mahathir (1982, p. 127)
argued that the activities of movements in civil society that tend to meddle in politics
should be curbed as they clearly aim to weaken government authority and do not
contribute to the public good. The government is of the opinion that opposition
parties and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) should be closely monitored as
they have the ability to influence public opinion, endanger public order, and even
obstruct well-planned national development. The state has labelled advocacy-
oriented NGOs together with the organised Left, dissident student movements,
labour groups and opposition political parties an ‘internal other’ against whom
society must struggle to remain peaceful, unified and secure. Whereas previously
NGOs and other dissident groups were labelled ‘Communist’, they are now
lambasted as ‘Western’ or ‘non-national’. For instance, Prime Minister Mahathir
verbally attacked citizens’ groups as ‘negative’, especially when they were critical of
his government’s policy. Mahathir went so far as to call the leaders of environmental
and human rights interest groups ‘anti-democratic saboteurs’ (Neher and Marlay,
1995, pp. 107–108). In fact, the role of these groups in politics is essential to ensure
the smoothness of the democratic system in Malaysia, the credibility of the judiciary,
and the effectiveness of the police and mass media.
Syed Husin Ali (2004, pp. 10–14) criticises the government, saying that political
elites use the argument of, for instance, strong government for national stability to
justify their neo-feudal thinking and paternalistic attitudes towards the ruler–ruled
relationship. The government tries to attract people’s loyalty and rejects dissident
views as unpatriotic. Thus, government leaders dominate political speech and limit
the opposition’s right to critical expression as a means to control public opinion and
stay in power. The Malaysian state, as the guarantor of the people’s interests,
censors and limits issues that can be discussed, marginalises people seen to hold
views critical of government policies, dislikes the creation of formal avenues to
articulate dissent, and tries to win support for its policies by promoting them as
being in the ‘national interest’ or as part of its endeavour to achieve national unity.
Only the government is allowed to define what is in the national interest and what
is not.
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The Malaysian government has good reasons for restricting political speech on the
basis of civil order and racial harmony, but it is still the case that it has manipulated
these issues to reinforce regime security/stability or its position in power. For
instance, political speech in the mainstream media is allowed only for the rulers and
government officials. The Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Information,
Zainuddin Maidin, reportedly told Parliament in October 2002 that opposition
parties will not be given air and radio time on state-owned television and radio
stations because Malaysia is ‘undeveloped’ (SUARAM, 2003a, pp. 25–26). He said
that ‘We are [Malaysia is] still a developing country. We will only be developed when
villagers (orang kampung) do not buy the issues of race and religion raised by the
opposition’. He added that opposition parties could disseminate their views through
the commercial media and the internet (SUARAM, 2003b, pp. 78–79). However, this
is unconvincing because opposition parties as well as the public are entitled to
participate in the political process of decision-making as long as they do not provoke
racial and religious conflict. The opposition parties should have the right to criticise
the government and should be allowed to publish their criticism in the mainstream
media. The constraints, therefore, are almost entirely unjustified, and without open
public political dialogue and criticism there is no political freedom or genuinely
democratic process.
There is no reason for the government to restrict political speech except for the
purpose of undermining the opposition, and maintaining its grip on political power.
Although an alternative media system does exist and takes the forms of alternative
print media and internet-based publications, the existence of such alternatives must
not simply be interpreted as the state being accommodating and taking a liberal
stance. On the contrary, it would be more accurate to regard these alternatives as
necessary irritants by the regime whose existence allows the regime continuously to
assert that freedom of speech does exist in Malaysia. When the irritation proves to be
a hindrance, the law has indeed been used to subdue and silence these alternative
outlets (Zaharom, 2002, p. 136).
The government, in the view of the present author, prefers the authoritarian style
control of political speech for two primarily political reasons. First, the UMNO-led
government is trying to suppress communal rivalries, especially from the Chinese
who control the Malaysian economy. UMNO believes that most Malays accept the
principle of ‘Ketuanan Melayu’ (Malay dominance), which claims precedence for the
Malays, as the presumed original inhabitants of the Malay Peninsula; and that they
should always hold political power and govern the country. Public political speech
by non-Malays might challenge ‘Malay dominance’ in politics. Second, the UMNO-
led government is also trying to counter Islamic-conservatism from the Islamic Party
(PAS) and multiracialism (referred to political parties with multiracial membership)
espoused by the People Justice Party (PKR) and the Democratic Action Party
(DAP). These three parties united to form one alliance, the People Alliance (PR),
after the 2008 general election. UMNO members, who embrace nationalism, believe
that the PAS Party is spreading Islamic-conservatism and, together with PKR and its
multiracialism, has split the Malay community. UMNO tries to unite Malays under
its umbrella of power and nationalism by suppressing or discrediting the PKR’s
political views in the mainstream media. These reasons are motivated more by a
desire to counter the rise of opposition parties and the capacity to challenge the
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government and have less to do with promoting racial harmony and political
stability. As has been argued earlier, restrictions on hate and racial speech are
justifiable in a multiracial society such as Malaysia, but to restrict non-hate and non-
racial political speech cannot be justified within a democratic system. In the context
of Malaysian politics, the government is clearly undermining the democratic process
and freedom of speech by restricting the right of the opposition parties and even the
NGOs to make their views publicly available. The public are also denied their right
of political speech and expression.
Conclusion
Malaysia has never experienced freedom of speech to the extent that the concept has
come to be practised in Western countries, particularly the United States and the
United Kingdom. However, the idea of free speech can be traced from the feudal
period of the Malay Sultanate. This idea was very limited in practice because the
feudal system denied people’s liberty even though the social contract was clearly
stated in the concepts of ‘daulat’ (sovereign) and ‘derhaka’ (disloyal). The modern
concept of freedom of speech was introduced gradually in Malaysia when the British
colonised the country and established a democratic political system of which
freedom of speech is an important element. However, the British were also
responsible for introducing laws such as the Emergency Ordinance and Sedition
Ordinance, which became models for later restrictions on freedom of speech. Since
independence in 1957, Malaysia has shown a greater tendency towards restricting
freedom of speech. This process has been politically motivated by the desire of the
government to limit and control any opposition. In sum, the Malaysian government
is able to dominate the public sphere through strict control of the media.
Strengthening media law and media ownership by companies that have close
relations with the political elite in the ruling government are some of the practices
that restrict freedom of the press and, more generally, freedom of speech as a whole.
The right to free speech, especially political speech, in current Malaysia remains
critical to the proper functioning of a well-informed society and democratic
practices. However, this freedom has to be reconciled against an urgent need for
racial harmony, civil order and political stability in the multiracial society of
Malaysia. The Malaysian government has obviously used the nation’s laws for its
own security and stability and to strengthen its hold on power, to restrain the
opposition and to control public opinion. Power has increasingly been concentrated
in the hands of the Executive, and the centralisation of power has blocked the
opposition, NGOs and media from serving as an effective check and balance on the
might of the government.
Notes
1. For instance, in the 1930s, papers of the Kuomintang Party, such as ‘Kwong Wah Yit Poh’, ‘Yit Khuan
Poh’, ‘San Yik Khuan Poh’, ‘Malayan Chinese Daily News’, ‘Min Kuo Jih Poh’ and ‘Sin Kuo Min
Press’, had been either censored or banned by the British Colonial government for publishing
propaganda news supporting the banned party of Kuomintang. The British government even
implemented different regulations for English papers and Chinese papers. The whole system was
considered quite repugnant to ideas of freedom of the press (Safar, 1996a, p. 155).
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2. Other provisions such as Article 3 stated that anyone who had been wrongly arrested or imprisoned
could appeal to the courts for redress. Article 4 stated that the sultan must treat the people with fairness
and with due respect, and rule according to the law and not according to his ‘whims and fancies’.
3. Perikatan changed its name to Barisan Nasional for the 1974 general election in a showing of solidarity
between political parties in a single component party after the eruption of racial riots on 13 May 1969.
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